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Abstract
The Netherlands was the first country that introduced a universal mandatory social health insurance
scheme for covering a broad range of long-term care (LTC) services provided in a variety of care
settings. Compared with most other OECD countries, both total and public expenditure on LTC is
high, particularly since the Dutch population is relatively young. On the other hand, coverage of LTC
services is relatively comprehensive. In this article we examine the past experiences, current deficiencies
and future prospects of LTC financing in the Netherlands. By rationing of supply and tight budgetary
restrictions, the government managed to effectively control the growth of LTC expenditure, but at the
expense of growing waiting lists and deteriorating quality of care. Reform plans aim to make the LTC
system more efficient and consumer-directed. We discuss whether the proposed reforms offer a
perspective on a sustainable system of comprehensive LTC insurance. This is especially important in
view of the ageing of the population and the expected increase in demand for LTC services. We
conclude that the success of the reforms heavily depends on the definition of entitlements, the accuracy
of needs assessment and the feasibility of determining appropriate client-based budgets.
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Introduction
In many OECD countries public expenditures on health and long-term care
(LTC) are a matter of great concern in view of an ageing population and
increasing constraints on public budgets. These concerns are particularly
vexing for countries with relatively high public expenditures on LTC, such as
the Netherlands. In comparison to most other OECD countries, both total
and public expenditures on LTC in the Netherlands are high, particularly
since the percentage of elderly people is similar to the OECD average (OECD
2005). This can at least partly be explained by the relatively generous social
health insurance scheme.
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Nevertheless, the growth of public spending on health and long-term care
in the Netherlands was quite successfully limited until 2000 via the implemen-
tation of cost-containment policies. These policies acted essentially through
the rationing of supply, wage moderation, price controls and postponement of
investment in LTC facilities. However, increasing waiting lists and rising
consumer expectations about the quality and variety of LTC services have
substantially reduced the scope for containing LTC expenditures along these
lines. Hence, the Dutch government is aiming to reform the current long-term
care financing system to increase incentives for efficiency and consumer
direction.
The main aims of this article are (1) to describe the background, past
experience and proposals to reform the system of LTC financing in the
Netherlands; and (2) to discuss whether the proposed reforms can create
incentives to keep the comprehensive LTC insurance scheme sustainable in
view of the ageing of the population and the expected increase in demand for
LTC services.
The second section provides a short background of the Dutch public health
insurance scheme. In the following section we discuss the main features of the
current public insurance scheme, before analysing the empirical evidence on
the growth of public expenditure on LTC over the period 1985–2005. The
subsequent section describes the relation between professional and informal
care, before focusing specifically on the implications of the introduction of the
personal care budgets for the provision of informal care. Next we discuss the
projections and determinants of future long-term expenditure growth. The
following section discusses the shortcomings of the current system of long-
term care financing, and then the proposals for reforming the system. Finally,
we discuss the prospects of the reform and the questions that remain to be
answered.
Since a uniform definition is lacking, we will first indicate what we mean by
long-term care. Often LTC is used only in the context of elderly care. In this
article, however, we use a more comprehensive definition, including also care
for the mentally and physically handicapped and care for chronic psychiatric
patients. This definition coincides with the types of services covered by the
public insurance scheme for long-term care in the Netherlands.
Background of Public LTC Insurance
The Netherlands was the first country to introduce a universal mandatory
social health insurance scheme (the Exceptional Medical Expenses Act,
abbreviated as AWBZ) for covering a broad range of LTC services provided
in a variety of care settings. Whereas in the Netherlands public LTC insur-
ance had already been introduced in 1968, other countries followed only quite
recently, like Germany in 1995 (see Rothgang, this issue) and Japan in 2000
(Ikegami 2007).
There are several reasons why in the Netherlands the choice was made for
a separate universal public health insurance scheme for long-term care. First,
prior to 1968 the financing of LTC facilities was highly fragmented and
increasingly insufficient to provide access to adequate care for lower-income
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groups. The strong economic growth during the 1960s substantially increased
the general welfare of society, but because of a lack of adequate funding the
availability and quality of LTC facilities lagged behind this overall welfare
increase. Hence, since the financial risk of LTC was considered to be largely
uninsurable on a private market,1 there was broad political support to expand
public financing for it.
Second, because of the presence of a social health insurance scheme for
curative health services (the Sickness Fund Act, abbreviated as ZFW) the
choice was made for public insurance rather than tax financing (as, for
instance, in Sweden and Norway). However, the prevailing sickness fund
scheme covered only two-thirds of the population (primarily lower- and
middle-income groups). Therefore, a straightforward expansion of this
scheme by including long-term care in the mandatory benefits package was no
option, because then the higher-income groups would not be included and
would not have to contribute to the financing of long-term care. An option
would have been to expand the prevailing mandatory social health insurance
scheme from two-thirds to the entire population, alongside an expansion of
the benefits package to include long-term care. Although this option was
seriously considered and actually proposed by the government, the proposal
was soon withdrawn because of strong resistance from private health insurers
(fearing a substantial loss of business), employers (fearing increasing employer
contributions) and the medical profession (fearing government control of fees
for services to privately insured patients). Since an expansion of the prevailing
social insurance scheme was not feasible (as, for instance, in Belgium and
Switzerland), a separate mandatory insurance scheme for long-term care
(AWBZ) for the entire Dutch population was proposed and enacted in 1968.
Initially, the AWBZ covered primarily nursing home care, institutionalized
care for the mentally handicapped, and hospital admissions lasting more than
a year. In due course, however, coverage was expanded by including home
health care, e.g. for rehabilitation at home after hospital admission and care
for elderly people with impairments (in 1980), ambulatory mental health care
(in 1982), family care, e.g. home help in case of frailty, psychosocial problems
or after childbirth (1989) and residential care for the elderly (1997). In homes
for the elderly (residential care) residents receive nursing care less frequently
and intensively than do residents in nursing homes. Moreover, residents in
elderly homes have their own apartments, while residents in nursing homes
usually share a room with one or more other residents.
Main Features of Public LTC Insurance
The AWBZ constitutes a mandatory insurance scheme for long-term care for
the entire Dutch population. Every Dutch citizen older than 15 years of age
with a taxable income has to pay an income-related contribution (up to a
certain maximum amount) that is collected through the income and payroll
tax systems, along with the contributions for the other national insurance
schemes (e.g. for unemployment and disability). In addition, for most LTC
services covered by the AWBZ, income-related co-payments are required. For
higher-income groups the maximum co-payment can be so high (about €1,800
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per month for residential care) that private facilities are often more attractive.
Income-related contributions and co-payments, as well as an annual state
subsidy are collected in a General Fund (abbreviated as AFBZ).
Table 1 provides an overview of the different sources of funding of the
AWBZ in 2008. Since in the same year the total expenditures from the
General Fund were €21.4 billion, there was an overall deficit of €2.1 billion (to
be compensated by an extra increase in the 2009 contribution rate). As shown
in table 1, more than 75 per cent of the AWBZ is financed directly by house-
holds, while the residual amount is paid by the state out of general taxes.
Table 2 provides an overview of the most important categories of LTC users
and their relative share in LTC expenditure.
Formally, the AWBZ is administered by health-care insurers which provide
coverage for curative health services. In practice, however, health-care
Table 1
Funding of the AWBZ scheme in 2008
Sources of funding Payments
(billion euros)
Share of total
payments (%)
Income-related contributions* 13.1 68
Co-payments 1.7 9
State subsidy (from general taxation) 4.6 24
Total 19.3 100
*In 2008 the income-related contribution was 12.15 per cent of a maximum of €31,589
taxable income (implying a maximum contribution of €3,838 per year, exclusive of various
possible tax deductions).
Source: SER (2008: 31).
Table 2
Different groups of AWBZ beneficiaries by numbers and expenditures in 2007*
Type of LTC user Number Share of
total number
(%)
Expenditure
(billion euro)
Share
of total
expenditure
(%)
Elderly and chronically ill 360,000 69 11.4 65
Mentally handicapped persons 100,000 19 4.6 26
Physically handicapped persons 15,000 3 0.5 3
Chronic psychiatric patients 50,000 9 1.1 6
Total 525,000 100 17.6 100
*Excluding about 90,000 clients with a personal care budget (expenditure €1.3 billion).
Source: SER (2008: 34).
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insurers have delegated various responsibilities – in particular the contracting
of health-care providers, the collection of patient contributions and the orga-
nization of regional consultations – to the largest regional health-care insurer.
At present, the Netherlands is divided into 32 care regions and in each region
a single health insurer (known as ‘regional care office’) carries out the AWBZ
on behalf of all health insurers for all residents living in that region. Regional
care offices receive a fixed budget for the administrative tasks. All LTC
expenses are directly paid out the General Fund (AFBZ). Hence, neither
regional care offices nor individual health insurers are at risk for long-term
care expenses covered by the AWBZ scheme.
Before a person can qualify for care under the AWBZ, it is necessary to
establish whether care is really required and, if so, what type of care and how
much care is needed. Initially, health-care providers were responsible for the
required needs assessment, but in 1997 this task was assigned to regional
independent needs assessment organizations, and since 2005 to a single
national organization (the Centre for Needs Assessment, abbreviated as CIZ).2
The idea behind this was to make needs assessment more objective and
uniform, and independent from the self-interest of health-care providers.
Notice that the access to LTC is solely based on a person’s health – as in
Germany and Japan – and does not depend on his/her income or wealth –
like the Medicaid programme in the USA.3
Prior to 2003, the LTC benefits covered by the AWBZ scheme were
defined in terms of the type of care or the type of health-care provider people
were entitled to. To encourage innovation, consumer choice and an efficient
substitution of LTC services, in 2003 the definition of entitlements was radi-
cally changed into seven broad functional care categories. In 2007 one of these
categories – domiciliary care – was excluded from coverage and transferred to
the responsibility of the municipalities under a new Social Support Act (abbre-
viated WMO). The remaining six functional categories of LTC services that
were covered under the AWBZ scheme in 2008 are summarized in box 1.4
Except for the functional category ‘accommodation’, clients who are
entitled to care have a choice of receiving it ‘in kind’ or in the form of a personal
care budget (or a combination of both). The personal care budget is set at about
75 per cent of the average cost of care provided ‘in kind’ because this budget
can be spent on informal care, which is expected to be less expensive than
professional formal care.
Expansion of LTC Services and Expenditure, 1968–2005
The enactment and gradual expansion of the public long-term insurance
scheme (AWBZ) paved the way for a strong growth of long-term care facilities
and of public expenditure on LTC. The percentage of GDP spent on long-
term services covered by AWBZ increased from 0.8 per cent in 1968 to 2.0 per
cent in 1980 and further to 4.0 per cent in 2005. Part of this increase, however,
is due to an expansion of AWBZ coverage.
As shown in figure 1, from 1985 to 2000 the percentage of GDP spent on
LTC services that were covered by AWBZ in 2000 was more or less stable,
around 3.5 per cent (in 1985, however, only 2.0 per cent was covered by
Social Policy & Administration, Vol. 44, No. 4, August 2010
© 2010 The Author(s)
Journal Compilation © 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
415
AWBZ and 1.5 per cent was financed in other ways). Hence, taking into
account the expansion of AWBZ coverage, the expenditure on LTC services
as a percentage of GDP has been quite constant over a considerable period of
time. This is remarkable given the ageing of the population (albeit fairly
moderate during that period) and the susceptibility of LTC to Baumol’s cost
disease due to the limited scope for productivity gains in the provision of care
(Oliviera Martins and Maisonneuve 2006). Despite the introduction of new
technologies in the area of healthy ageing, the quality of many LTC services
is likely to remain highly dependent on the input of labour. Therefore, the
scope of substituting capital for labour is limited.5
The main reason for the limited growth of public spending on LTC has
been the implementation of cost-containment policies. Already in the 1970s
the entry and capacity of new LTC institutions was strictly regulated. For
building and major investments in facilities a licence from the government was
required, and only if investments were judged to be of sufficient priority was
such a licence granted. Particularly important, however, was the introduction
in 1984 of a system of global budgeting for all inpatient long-term health
services. In addition, especially during the 1980s the government successfully
mitigated the wages of nursing personnel. In the 1990s, prompted by an
economic recession, the budgetary controls were expanded to include also
home health care and other outpatient LTC services.
The persistent rationing of supply, postponement of investments and bud-
getary controls resulted in growing waiting lists and a general perception of a
deterioration of quality, particularly compared to the general increase in
standard of living and the rising expectations about the quality of care people
would like to receive in old age. In 1999 the long waiting lists for home health
care were successfully challenged in court. The court ruled that public LTC
insurance entitled people to timely access to home health care, and that
Box 1
Functional categories of care covered by AWBZ
1. Personal care: e.g. help with taking a shower, bed baths, dressing, shaving, skin care,
going to the toilet, eating and drinking.
2. Nursing: e.g. dressing wounds, giving injections, advising on how to cope with illness,
showing clients how to self-inject.
3. Supportive guidance: e.g. helping the client organize his/her day and manage his/her life
better, as well as day care or provision of daytime activities.
4. Activating guidance: e.g. talking to the client to help him/her modify behaviour or learn
new forms of behaviour in cases where behavioural or psychological problems exist.
5. Treatment: e.g. care in connection with an ailment, such as serious absent-mindedness.
6. Accommodation: e.g. some people are not capable of living independent lives, but
require, for example, sheltered housing or continuous supervision in connection
with serious absent-mindedness. In some cases, a client’s care requirements may be too
great to address in a home environment, making admission to an institution necessary.
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budgetary considerations were no valid reason for withholding care. In fact,
the court decision implied that a too stringent rationing of health services was
not compatible with the ‘right to care’ that was guaranteed by the social
insurance legislation (AWBZ).
Urged on by the court decision and the mounting public and political
pressure to improve access and quality of LTC services, in 2000 the govern-
ment decided to lift the budgetary controls and to reimburse all extra pro-
duction necessary to reduce waiting lists. Indeed, from 2000 to 2003 waiting
lists were substantially reduced: for home health care by 64 per cent, for
nursing homes by 39 per cent and for elderly homes by 23 per cent (Van
Gameren 2005). As a consequence, during that period the expenditure on
long-term care rapidly increased to more than 10 per cent per year (see
Figure 1
Percentage of GDP spent on LTC services covered by AWBZ in the current year and in
2005, from 1985 to 2005
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figure 2), resulting in an increase from 3.5 to 4.0 per cent in the share of GDP
spent on LTC (see figure 1).
During the period 1985–2005 the average annual growth of real expendi-
ture on long-term care services covered by AWBZ was 3.3 per cent, whereas
the average annual increase of GDP was about 2.7 per cent. The average
difference of 0.6 per cent, however, is completely caused by the high cost
inflation during the short period from 2000 to 2003. As shown in figure 3, the
largest share of expenditure growth can be explained by an increase in relative
prices (2.0 per cent) while about 1.3 per cent can be attributed to an increase
in production.6
From figure 3 it can be concluded that for four of the five major categories
of long-term care services the annual cost growth was about 4 per cent, which
is well above the annual increase of GDP. This relatively high cost increase is
largely compensated, however, by a relatively low cost increase of residential
elderly care (on average about 1.3 per cent per year). This is caused by a
decrease in production (on average -0.7 per cent per year) due to reductions
in the capacity of elderly homes and a substitution towards home health care.
As a result, the annual production growth in home health care is the largest
among the five categories of LTC services (on average about 2.5 per cent per
year). Clearly, this reflects the trend that elderly people are treated at home for
a longer period.
As shown in figure 4, labour productivity for all LTC services decreased by
0.3 per cent over the entire 1985–2005 period, contributing slightly to the
overall price increase. This corroborates the supposition that Baumol’s
cost disease is particularly relevant for LTC services (Oliviera Martins and
Figure 2
Annual growth of LTC expenditures financed by public insurance (AWBZ)
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Maisonneuve 2006). Contrary to the general trend, labour productivity in
home health care increased by on average 0.7 per cent per year during the
same period. The increase in labour productivity in home health care has
been particularly pronounced since 1995 and is attributed to a tightening of
the budgets for home health care agencies, resulting in a relative decline in
administrative and managerial personnel and the introduction of benchmark-
ing and time management to increase the efficiency of production (Eggink
et al. 2008).
Looking at the development of long-term care expenditure in the period
1985–2000, supply regulation and budgetary restrictions were clearly quite
effective in containing cost. The downside of the prolonged rationing poli-
cies, however, was increasing waiting lists, resulting in a growing public
discontent and incompatibility with the legally established entitlements to
LTC services. For this reason, in 2000 a continuation of the prevailing cost
containment strategy was no longer politically feasible. On the other hand,
the radical change towards an open-ended reimbursement policy proved to
be no solution either, since the resulting excessive cost inflation – without
accompanying incentives for efficiency – was not sustainable. Already in
2004 the government tried to regain control over LTC expenditure by con-
cluding agreements with the interest associations of LTC providers to limit
Figure 3
Average annual growth (%) of LTC benefits covered by AWBZ, 1985–2005
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the growth of expenditure and to increase productivity. In addition, particu-
larly for home health services, co-payments were increased. In 2005, the
government reinstated budgetary controls by imposing regional budgets for
each of the 32 regions, based on the past expenditure on LTC in that region.
Regional care offices were made responsible for the allocation of these
budgets and had to negotiate with regional providers about prices and
maximum output levels. By reintroducing tight budget constraints, the gov-
ernment runs the risk that waiting lists will increase, which could again
generate a conflict with the existing legal entitlement to LTC. In contrast to
the late 1990s, however, there is an important safety valve: the personal care
budget. Since personal care budgets do not fall under the scope of the
regional budget constraints, LTC providers can exceed their budgets if they
can persuade their clients to apply for a personal budget and to use this to
pay the provider. Indeed, this is one of reasons for the vast and increasing
popularity of personal care budgets.
Personal Care Budgets and Informal Care
Personal care budgets were introduced in 1995 as a small-scale experiment to
provide consumers with the option to buy and organize their own home
Figure 4
Components of the growth of real prices of LTC benefits, 1985–2005
-1
0
1
2
3
Total
care
Elderly
homes
Nursing
homes
Mentally
handicapped
care
Mental health
care
Labour productivity Hourly wages Material cost Total
Home health
Source: Eggink et al. (2008).
Social Policy & Administration, Vol. 44, No. 4, August 2010
© 2010 The Author(s)
Journal Compilation © 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
420
health services instead of using ‘in kind’ services contracted by the regional
care offices (Van den Berg and Hassink 2008). Since 1995 the personal care
budget scheme has been significantly expanded both in scope and expendi-
ture. As of 2008 personal care budgets comprise about 7 per cent of long-
term care expenditure covered by AWBZ and are used by more than 10 per
cent of LTC users. Table 3 provides some key figures about personal budgets
in 2005.
There were several reasons that were put forward for the introduction of
personal care budgets (Hessing-Wagner 1990). First, such budgets were con-
sidered as a means to empower consumers and to motivate providers to better
meet consumer preferences. During the 1990s LTC providers were increas-
ingly criticized for not being able to deliver the right services at the right time.
Moreover, the new generation of LTC users had higher expectations and was
supposed to be better able to express its preferences for LTC. By the option to
choose a personal budget instead of contracted LTC services, people would be
able to arrange care according to their own preferences.
A second reason for introducing personal care budgets was to encourage
the use and provision of informal care as a cheap alternative to professional
formal care. Informal care is a crucial part of long-term care all over the
world. In the Netherlands, however, informal care plays a relatively minor
Table 3
Key figures of personal care budget in 2005
Number of budget-holders: 77,883
Age distribution (years) 18–55 32.5%
56–65 12.6%
66–75 14.3%
76–80 8.7%
Type of health problem Somatic 67%
Psychogeriatric 1%
Psychiatric 14%
Physical handicap 14%
Mental handicap 11%
Sensory handicap 1%
Net budget amount (euros)* <2,500 27.7%
2500–5000 24.9%
5000–25,000 30.5%
>25,000 16.9%
Proportion of budget spent on informal care Resident providers 21%
Non-resident providers 17%
*Net of co-payments by budget-holder. The average gross personal care budget was about
€14,000, of which about €1,000 was paid by the budget-holder out-of-pocket.
Source: Ministry of Health (2006).
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role, which is partly due to the relatively generous coverage of professional
formal LTC services.
Using 2004 data from the Survey of Health Ageing and Retirement in
Europe (SHARE) Albertini et al. (2007) show that within Europe the annual
amount of informal care per caregiver is lowest in the Netherlands, Denmark,
France and Sweden (around 300 hours) and highest in Italy (almost 1,500
hours). Also using SHARE data, Bolin et al. (2008) show that the mean hours
of received informal care by single-living elderly per year in the Netherlands
is among the lowest within Europe (approximately 50 hours), while in Greece,
Italy and Spain the single-living elderly receive the most informal care (over
200 hours). Conditional upon receiving informal care, the amount of care
received by the single Dutch elderly is also among the lowest in Europe (about
130 hours per year).
In terms of professional home care use, the opposite pattern seems to hold.
Bolin et al. (2008) show that the Netherlands (together with Denmark and
France) belongs to the European top of professional home care use. Of
single-living Dutch elderly, approximately 25 per cent use professional home
care, while the proportion is the smallest in Italy (6 per cent).
Although the share of informal care in the Netherlands is lower than in
most other European countries, still the majority of home care is provided by
informal caregivers. Table 4 shows that in the Netherlands the amount of
home care used in 2001 was just around 15 per cent of the total amount of
informal care provided. Nevertheless, table 4 also shows the enormous growth
of professional home care use (especially skilled housework) during the rela-
tively short period 2000–3.
The rapid expansion of personal care budgets was an effective way to
encourage the provision of informal care. In 2005, some 38 per cent of
personal care budgets were spent on informal care, while two-thirds of
budget-holders use the budget for paying informal caregivers (Ramakers and
Van den Wijngaart 2005). Next to personal care budgets, the role of informal
care was also increased by restricting the possibilities for substituting profes-
sional for informal care. Initially, using informal care was considered to be
people’s voluntary choice. Even people having a social network with potential
informal caregivers could always apply to get professional care that was
covered by the AWBZ. In practice, however, the needs assessment agencies
increasingly took into account the amount of informal care a client already
received in order to determine the amount of professional care the client could
legally claim ( Jörg et al. 2002). Since 2003, this practice has been formalized,
and strict protocols were developed regarding needs assessments, taking into
account the potential amount of informal care the care recipient’s social
network could provide.
Another way to encourage the provision of informal care was to support
informal caregivers. To prevent these caregivers getting health problems
themselves, needs assessment agencies were permitted to refer caregivers to
regional support centres. The support centres developed all kinds of respite
care programmes, such as day care, short stays in nursing homes, holidays,
and informational support (see e.g. Koopmanschap et al. 2004; Van Exel et al.
2006).
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Evaluative studies point out that, as intended, personal care budgets
induced a substitution of informal for professional care, and were valued by
many clients as an effective means to purchase and organize care that better
meets their preferences than regular care contracted by regional care offices
(Ramakers et al. 2007). However, personal care budgets also had several unin-
tended negative effects. First, they induced a substitution of paid for unpaid
informal care. Informal care by relatives, neighbours and friends that previ-
ously was often provided for free, was becoming increasingly paid for. A study
among informal caregivers pointed out that 76 per cent of the caregivers would
be willing to provide the same care without receiving payment, although 78 per
cent indicated that getting paid nevertheless was important to them (Ramakers
and Van den Wijngaart 2005). In addition, an increasing number of brokers
became active, who in return for a fee offered to assist people in applying for
a personal care budget. Van den Berg and Schut (2003) calculated that a
substitution of paid for unpaid informal care from the personal care budget
could result in an increase of AWBZ costs of approximately €4 billion per year
(about 20 per cent of total AWBZ expenditure).7 Counteracting the substitu-
tion of paid for unpaid informal care was another reason for implementing the
above-mentioned strict needs assessment protocols that explicitly take into
account the amount of informal care that the recipient’s social network could
provide. According to the protocols, needs were not only based on health status
or functional impairments but also on the availability of ‘usual care’. For
instance, the care partners provide to each other during at least three months
is defined as usual care. Hence, the magnitude of the personal care budget
became explicitly dependent on the social network of the beneficiary. Never-
theless, it is unclear to what extent people still can use personal care budgets
for replacing unpaid with paid informal care. Especially, the fast-increasing
number of personal care budgets for the assistance of young people with
psychiatric disorders has been attributed to the substitution of paid for unpaid
informal care provided by their parents.
A second drawback was that personal budgets were increasingly used by
home health care agencies to escape the imposed budget constraints. As a
consequence also, people who did not want to purchase and arrange care for
themselves were more or less forced to do so in order to be able to keep the
same home care provider.
It is difficult to assess to what extent personal care budgets were successful
in accomplishing the aims behind their introduction. The rapidly increasing
number of people opting for a personal care budget suggests that for a
substantial proportion of users of outpatient LTC the budgets offered better
opportunities to meet consumer preferences than care in kind. The problem
is, however, that there is not much empirical information about the true
motives of people to opt for the personal care budget. For instance, the
growing demand for personal care budgets can at least partly be explained by
the motivation to evade waiting lists for traditionally financed LTC and by
consumer preferences to pay formerly unpaid informal caregivers. It is also
unclear to what extent personal care budgets induced an efficient substitution
of informal for formal care or just an expansion of paid informal care. For
instance, the increasing number of parents opting for a personal care budget
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to provide care for their children seems to point to a substitution of paid for
unpaid informal care. Moreover, for this group of clients it is unlikely that
empowerment and better consumer-directed care were the main drivers to
opt for a personal budget. In contrast, it seems fair to conclude that for people
with long-term disabilities, personal care budgets really provide an instrument
that helps them to empower themselves and to purchase care that better meets
their preferences than care in kind.
Projections of Future LTC Expenditure
Future expenditure on LTC depends on a number of factors, both demo-
graphic and non-demographic. Several projections of future LTC expendi-
tures have been made, which are not completely comparable because they are
based on different definitions of LTC and use different assumptions and
methodologies.
In a study about the drivers of public LTC expenditures (primarily elderly
care), Oliviera Martins and Maisonneuve (2006) explicitly model the potential
determinants of future LTC expenditure to project the expected share of
GDP spent on LTC in 2050 for 30 OECD countries. The main results of their
projections for the Netherlands and average OECD are summarized in
table 5.
Since the dependency on LTC increases sharply with age, demographic
effects contribute to a substantial increase in LTC expenditures. The effects of
ageing on LTC consumption might be mitigated by a ‘healthy ageing’ process
if longevity gains are fully or partially translated in additional years of good
health. Since the empirical evidence about the occurrence (and extent) of a
healthy ageing process is mixed, Oliviera Martins and Maisonneuve (2006)
assume that only half of the longevity gains are translated into a reduction in
dependency.8 In addition, they also estimate the effect of a full healthy ageing
process (compression of disability) and a complete absence of healthy ageing
(expansion of disability).
In projecting future LTC expenditures, Oliviera Martins and Maison-
neuve (2006) capture the Baumol effect by assuming that unit costs rise in line
with aggregate labour productivity, a proxy for wage growth of care staff. As
shown in table 5, this full Baumol effect induces a steady increase in relative
prices, pushing LTC expenditures to 3.7 per cent of GDP in the Netherlands
and to 3.3 per cent for the OECD countries on average. In addition, the
effects of potential cost containment policies were simulated assuming that
governments would be able to mitigate the cost pressures associated with
the Baumol effect, by stimulating productivity gains and mitigating wage
increase.
Under the base scenario, Oliviera Martins and Maisonneuve (2006) assume
an income elasticity of zero, since they argue that LTC can be characterized
as a necessity. Although empirical evidence of income elasticities for LTC are
lacking, estimated income elasticities for health care in general are all above
unity at a country level (Getzen 2000). This suggests that – at least for
industrialized countries – health care can be considered as a luxury. Since the
substitution of professional care for informal care can be seen as a luxury that
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may be only publicly affordable if a country as a whole reaches a certain
aggregate income level, long-term care may well be a luxury rather than a
necessity. If this is true, the result of the sensitivity analysis using a unitary
income elasticity may be more relevant. Table 5 shows that this implies that in
2050 an extra 0.5 per cent of GDP would be spent on LTC.
The authors also estimate the effect of an increase in dependency as a result
of increasing disability rates (assumed to be 0.5 per cent per year) due to a
continuation of the current trends in obesity. Finally, the authors examine the
impact of an ‘increased participation’ scenario in which the availability of
informal care is dramatically reduced by assuming that all countries converge
towards a labour participation ratio in the age group of 50–64 years (which is
used as a proxy for the availability of informal care) of at least 70 per cent by
2050. As shown in table 5, both an increase in dependency and an increase in
labour market participation are likely to have a substantial impact on LTC
expenditure in the Netherlands and other OECD countries.
Specific projections of the future cost of LTC in the Netherlands have been
made by the Netherlands Institute for Social Research (SCP) and the Dutch
National Bureau for Economic Research (CPB). Based on the expected
growth of the number of users, the SCP study projected an annual growth of
expenditure on home health care, elderly homes and nursing home care of
about 1.3 per cent in constant prices for the period 2005–30 (Eggink et al.
2008). The projected increase in cost is higher than the projected increase in
the number of users, which can be explained by the higher expected growth
in the number of users of the most expensive LTC facilities (especially nursing
homes).
The CPB followed another methodology to project future expenditure on
LTC (SER 2008). After making the observation that expenditures on LTC are
very sensitive to the type of government policy, the CPB made a distinction
between two extreme scenarios. The first is based on a prolonged policy of
supply and price regulation as in the period 1990–2000. Since during this
period the annual growth of LTC expenditure was 0.6 per cent lower than the
growth of GDP, the CPB assumes that under this scenario the same difference
in growth would occur during the next decade. This would result in a decline
in the proportion of GDP spent on LTC to 3.5 per cent in 2020 (using a broad
definition of LTC, as in this article). The second scenario is based on a
prolonged policy of laissez faire, as was prevalent from 2000 to 2006. During
this period the annual rise in expenditure on LTC was about 3.8 per cent
higher than the growth of GDP. Using this figure as the relevant difference
under the second scenario, the resulting share of GDP spent on LTC in 2020
would be 6.4 per cent.
Since both extreme scenarios are unlikely, the 3.5 and 6.4 per cent of GDP
can be perceived as lower and upper bounds on the LTC expenditure in 2020
(using a broad definition of LTC). The crucial role of health policy is in line
with the observation by the OECD (2005) that the correlation across countries
between LTC spending and ageing is rather weak, suggesting that the way of
organizing and financing LTC plays an important role.
The overall conclusion that emerges from these projections is that the
future expenditure on LTC are extremely uncertain and very sensitive to the
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exact growth of the number of elderly, changes in real prices of LTC (due to
changes in labour productivity and the quality and intensity of care), changes
in health policy, changes in labour market participation and trends in disabil-
ity among the elderly.
Deficiencies of Current LTC Financing
The projections of future expenditure on long-term care make clear that a
laissez faire policy without supply and demand constraints (as in the period
2000–3) is likely to jeopardize the sustainability of the public LTC insurance
scheme. On the other hand, a return to the stringent top–down rationing
policy of the 1990s has serious drawbacks and does not seem feasible either.
Faced with this dilemma, the government has temporarily opted for a mixture
of the two policies, half-heartedly relying on both supply constraints and
arrangements to improve efficiency by increasing consumer direction and
choice. For the following reasons, this inconsistent policy compromise can
achieve neither cost containment nor an effective increase in efficiency.
First, the currently imposed supply constraints in the form of regional care
budgets are not effective in controlling cost because they can be circumvented
by opting for a personal care budget. Since personal care budgets are not
included under the regional budget, the regional budget constraint is not
binding. Although the government introduced a separate macro budget for
personal care budgets, particularly since 2005 the demand for personal care
budgets has been much larger than the available funds. Rather than denying
personal care budgets, the government regularly adjusts the macro budget
upwards to meet the growing demand. In 2007, for instance, the government
decided four times to raise the budget, resulting in a total annual budget
increase of 35 per cent (Ministry of Health 2007).
Second, the regional budget mechanism punishes providers who do a good
job and consequently attract more clients than the target number on which
their budget is based. If these presumably efficient providers cannot effectively
motivate their clients to apply for a personal care budget, they have to refuse
clients or run a deficit.
Third, regional care offices do not have an incentive to allocate the regional
budget to the most efficient providers because they have a regional monopoly
and are not at risk for the cost of care. Since LTC users cannot choose another
regional care office, these offices have no incentive to allocate budgets to
providers that best meet consumer preferences. Again, consumers may opt for
a personal care budget (except for inpatient care), but this is not likely to
discipline the behaviour of the regional offices because they do not benefit
from having more customers. Moreover, since regional offices get a fixed
budget for administrative cost, they have a financial incentive to negotiate
with a limited number of large providers in order to minimize the cost of
contracting. For the same reason, regional care offices have no incentive to
take action against over-lenient needs assessment procedures.
Finally, the definition of entitlements in terms of six functional categories
(see box 1) has proven to be too imprecise to provide a firm basis for uniform
and unambiguous needs assessment. In particular, the number of clients that
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were assessed to be in need of ‘supportive guidance’ increased dramatically,
by 37 per cent from 2005 to 2007 (Ministry of Health 2008).
Proposals to Reform LTC Financing
In view of the serious deficiencies of the current system of LTC financing, the
government asked a number of advisory and supervisory bodies9 to draft
proposals for reforming the system of LTC financing in order to guarantee a
sustainable, efficient and consumer-directed provision of LTC.
This resulted in five different advisory reports, which were not all equivo-
cal. Reports by the Council on Health Insurance (CVZ) and the Council of
Public Health and Care (RVZ) recommended the complete abolition of the
separate public long-term insurance scheme. Most of the benefits covered by
AWBZ had to be included into the new national Health Insurance Act for
curative health services (abbreviated ZVW) and the remaining benefits
(related to social support and participation) into the new Social Support Act
(abbreviated WMO). The main line of reasoning was that the new health
insurance scheme for curative services – based on the model of managed
competition (Van de Ven and Schut 2008) – would provide much stronger
incentives for efficiency and meeting consumer preferences than the AWBZ.
Moreover, integrating curative and long-term care into a single scheme would
also provide incentives and possibilities for a better coordination of care for
people with chronic diseases. Next, the original reasons for a separate public
insurance scheme (see the section on background, above) were no longer
valid, since the mandatory insurance scheme for curative services was
extended to the entire population in 2006. Finally, the 2007 Social Support
Act (WMO) provided an integrated legal framework for social and commu-
nity support under the responsibility of municipalities, so the transfer of social
care benefits from the AWBZ to the WMO would also enhance a better
coordination of social care and welfare assistance.
The radical proposals to abolish the AWBZ scheme, however, also had
serious potential shortcomings. Most importantly, it is questionable whether
the model of managed competition underlying the new health insurance
scheme for curative services is adequate for the provision and financing of
long-term care (Van de Ven and Schut 1994). A key element of the managed
competition model, which makes it possible to guarantee universal access in a
competitive health insurance market, is an adequate system of risk adjustment
(Van de Ven and Schut 2008). At present, there are no appropriate risk
adjusters available for LTC and it is even unclear whether adequate risk
adjustment is feasible for many of these services (IBO-werkgroep AWBZ
2006). Given the typically high level of expenditure per LTC user and the
intertemporal nature of the risk, imperfect risk adjustment for these types of
services may result in unfair competition among insurers and huge incentives
for risk selection if insurers are obliged to charge community-rated premiums
(as is the case under the 2006 Health Insurance Act). Another reason why the
managed competition model may not be appropriate for LTC services is that
for many of these services consumers are not able or willing to make an
informed choice among health insurers that contract these services. There is
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substantial empirical evidence that the propensity to switch health plans
substantially declines with age and the presence of health problems
(Strombom et al. 2002; Schut et al. 2003; Buchmueller 2006). For LTC services
for which the number of critical buyers is too small, competition may result in
a deterioration of quality, since competitive health insurers may have an
incentive to reduce quality in order to reduce cost if this does not result in a
significant loss of market share (Van de Ven and Schut 1994). Finally, the
experience with both the new Health Insurance Act and the new Social
Support Act is limited and it is unclear whether health insurers and munici-
palities are willing and able to perform as prudent purchasers of health and
social services. Therefore, a major expansion of the scope of the responsibili-
ties of health insurers and municipalities would be premature.
In view of these shortcomings, other advisory reports proposed to maintain
a separate insurance scheme for several categories of LTC, at least including
care for the mentally handicapped. Among these reports, the proposal by the
Social and Economic Council was the latest and the most important (SER
2008). The SER proposed to reform the AWBZ along the following main lines:
1. A much more precise and unambiguous delineation and definition of
entitlements.
2. An improvement of the needs assessment by developing uniform protocols,
benchmarking and a permanent supervision of the assessment bodies.
3. A reduction of coverage by transferring short-term rehabilitation services
to the health insurance scheme for curative health services (Health
Insurance Act) and by bringing the provision of social care under the
responsibility of the municipalities (Social Support Act).
4. A far-reaching separation of the financing of accommodation and care,
implying that accommodation would no longer be reimbursed by public
insurance; a subsidy scheme for lower-income groups to pay for the cost
of accommodation; the separation of care and accommodation should
lead to innovative combinations of accommodation, care, welfare and
participation.
5. A replacement of provider-based budgeting by client-based budgeting.
Rather than clients having to follow the money – as in the current provider-
based budgeting system – the money should follow the client. Clients would
have the option to choose a personal care budget (as in the current system)
and arrange all care by themselves, or to choose among providers con-
tracted by individual health insurers (that would have to replace regional
care offices in 2012). Providers can increase revenues if they are able to
attract more clients by offering better service (for a fixed budget per client).
The client-based budgets should be based on the categorization of clients in
‘care-severity packages’ (abbreviated ZZPs) by the needs assessment bodies.
A ‘care-severity package’ describes the type and amount of care needed by
the client. For each ‘care-severity package’ a budget will be calculated.
In June 2008 the government declared its endorsement of the main
lines of the SER proposal and announced the first steps to implement its
recommendations, including a more precise demarcation of entitlements and
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an exclusion of recovery and social support from coverage by 2009 (Ministry
of Health 2008). In a subsequent policy letter by mid-2009, the reform plans
were further elaborated (Ministry of Health 2009). In this letter the govern-
ment stated its aim of abolishing the regional care offices in 2012 and instead
making individual health insurers responsible for the purchasing and contract-
ing of LTC services on behalf of their insured (next to maintaining the option
for clients to choose a personal care budget or voucher and to purchase care
by themselves). However, this decision is made contingent on the possibility of
making health insurers financially accountable for the LTC expenses of their
insured and on the feasibility of an adequate system of client-based budgeting.
Towards Sustainable LTC Financing?
Whether the proposed reform will lead to sustainable financing and more
consumer-directed provision of long-term care services crucially depends on
the ability to develop a clear-cut definition of entitlements, to improve the
accuracy of needs assessment,10 and to develop appropriate ‘care-severity
packages’ as a solid basis for client-based budgeting. The feasibility of these
three requirements is highly uncertain. In particular, client-based budgeting
may turn out to be complicated. In 2008, ‘care-severity packages’ (ZZPs) have
been developed for inpatient care, which from 2009 to 2011 will be phased in
to determine the budgets for inpatient care LTC facilities (i.e. nursing homes,
elderly homes, institutions for the mentally and physically handicapped and
mental care institutions). The experience with these care-severity packages for
financing inpatient care may make clear whether they can provide a firm basis
for client-based financing. A key question will be whether the predictable cost
variation per care package will be small enough to avoid problems of cream-
skimming and misallocation of funds.11 The first experiences with the intro-
duction of client-based budgeting for inpatient LTC were evaluated by the
Dutch Healthcare Authority (NZa 2009). The NZa reported that it received
signals from both health-care providers and regional care offices of strategic
upcoding (classifying clients in higher ZZPs than indicated) and risk selection
(avoiding patients that are unprofitable given the ZZP capitation payment).
The main reason put forward for such behaviour was that for several ZZPs or
for several patients classified within a certain ZZP, capitation payments were
insufficient to cover the costs. Based on the limited available data, the NZa
could not determine whether upcoding and risk selection indeed occurred, but
it announced its intention to monitor this type of behaviour and to examine
the accuracy of ZZP payments.
An important, yet unanswered question is how future client-based budgets
should be determined: should they be based on the average cost of all pro-
viders that offer the care package? Given the increasing pressure to contain
public expenditure on LTC services, the most likely outcome may be that the
client-based budgets will be derived from the regional budgets (or a national
budget) set by the government, using the care-severity packages as relative
weights for determining the (regional) level of the client-based budget for each
care package.12 The way of determining the budget will be closely related to
another still unanswered question, namely for which party the client-based
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budget should be binding. In other words, if the actual cost of providing a care
package differs from the client-based budget, then who should bear the
additional costs or keep the residual: the client, the provider, or the insurer
contracting the provider? At present, providers receive the full ZZP capitation
payments for each client they serve and neither clients nor regional care
offices bear financial risk (except for the income-related co-payments clients
have to pay). However, if risk-bearing health insurers replace regional care
offices by 2012, it is conceivable that ZZP capitation payments will be given to
the insurers, which subsequently have to negotiate prices per ZZP with
various LTC providers.
In theory, the Dutch proposed reforms involve appropriate incentives to
improve the sustainability of the comprehensive LTC insurance scheme. As
argued, in practice the success of the reforms will depend heavily on the way
entitlements are defined, an improvement of the accuracy of needs assessment
and the feasibility of determining appropriate client-based budgets. For
adequate client-based budgeting it is crucial that the care-severity packages
that are currently being developed are relatively homogeneous in terms of
predicted costs as substantial variation involves clear incentives for upcoding
and risk selection.
Although the proposed reform offers a promising perspective to combine a
sustainable and universally accessible LTC financing with a consumer-
directed provision of care, a number of complicated issues have to be resolved.
The Dutch experiences in implementing the reform may therefore provide
important lessons for countries with a public insurance scheme for long-term
care – e.g. Japan and Germany – that also struggle with the question of how
to guarantee a sustainable, universally accessible and high-quality system of
long-term care (Ikegami 2007; see also Rothgang, this issue). In addition, it
may also provide important lessons for countries considering the introduction
of a system of social insurance for long-term care (see Barr, this issue).
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Notes
1. There are several reasons why private markets fail to provide adequate insurance
for LTC. The absence of private LTC insurance has been explained (e.g. Cutler
1996; Brown and Finkelstein 2007) by the nature of intertemporal risk, by supply-
side market failure (resulting from high transaction costs, adverse selection and
imperfect competition) and by demand-side factors such as limited consumer
rationality, limited foresight, and the availability of imperfect but cheaper
substitutes.
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2. As of 2008, this Centre for Needs Assessment (CIZ) has one main office, six district
offices and 30 local offices.
3. Following the recently proposed typology by Ariizumi (2008), the Dutch public
insurance system can be characterized as a health-based rather than a means-
tested programme.
4. As of 2009, two functional categories – supportive and activating guidance – are
combined into a single category ‘guidance’. At the same time, guidance that is
aimed at social participation is excluded from coverage and brought under the
scope of the Social Support Act (WMO).
5. When productivity growth in the LTC sector lags behind that in other sectors
while wages grow at the same rate, relative prices of LTC vis-à-vis other goods and
services in the economy will rise. In the case of a low price elasticity of demand for
LTC – which is likely in the presence of public insurance – the share of LTC
expenditure in GDP will also increase over time.
6. Production of LTC services is measured by the Netherlands Institute for Social
Research (Eggink et al. 2008) using indicators of production (e.g. admissions, day
treatments, length of stay, number of patients, etc.) weighted by the type and
intensity of treatment.
7. This number was based on the assumption that a substantial proportion of
informal caregivers already get paid from the personal care budget (see also Van
den Berg and Hassink 2008). Their average payment is around €10 per hour.
Multiplication of this average payment with the informal care hours presented in
table 4 makes approximately €4 billion.
8. For the Netherlands this assumption might be an underestimation. In the Neth-
erlands the ratio of disability-free life expectancy to life expectancy at age 65 was
79 per cent for men and 67 per cent for women in 2000 (OECD 2005). The ratio
has increased since 1990, particularly for women.
9. Specifically, the Social and Economic Council (SER), the Council for Public
Health and Health Care (RVZ), the Health Care Insurance Board (CVZ), the
Dutch Healthcare Authority (NZa), and a governmental working group (IBO).
10. In the Japanese LTC insurance scheme, for instance, nationally uniform stan-
dardized eligibility criteria are used to determine which services the elderly are
entitled to (Ikegami 2007).
11. The determination of adequate ZZP capitation payments for outpatient LTC may
be more complicated because the need for outpatient care crucially depends on
the availability of a social network of informal caregivers, which typically varies
substantially across individuals.
12. Using national rather than regional budgets may be politically attractive because
then government may avoid a socially controversial regional variation in the level
of client-based budgets.
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